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Job Displacement, Relative Wage 
Changes, and Duration of 
Unemployment 
John T. Addison, University of South Carolina and 
Universitdt Bamberg 
Pedro Portugal, Universidade do Porto, Instituto Nacional de 
Investigacao Cientifica, and University of South Carolina 
Using special CPS data on displaced workers, this article investigates 
the wage consequences of job displacement in a framework that em- 
phasizes the effects of past job duration(s) and unemployment du- 
ration(s) on postdisplacement wages. Our model also attempts to 
take account of the simultaneity between unemployment duration 
and the postdisplacement wage. It is found that duration strongly 
reduces subsequent earnings and that considerable overstatement of 
the loss in firm-specific training investments is implied by conventional 
routes to measuring wage losses. 
I. Introduction 
This article investigates the economic implications of involuntary job 
loss occasioned by plant closings and employment cutbacks for a large, 
nationally representative sample of male workers displaced between January 
1979 and January 1984. The goal is to identify the determinants of changes 
in earnings following displacement. To this end, we employ three different 
specifications for the postdisplacement earnings function. An important 
feature of the analysis is the justification and use of a flexible specification 
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for the postdisplacement wage equation that allows for the effects of past 
job duration and unemployment duration; factors that have been ignored 
in the small but growing displacement literature (e.g., Shapiro and Sandell 
1985; Podgursky and Swaim 1987). 
Our principal findings are as follows. First, the returns to tenure observed 
on the predisplacement job do not vanish on displacement; that is, previous 
tenure has a positive impact on postdisplacement wages. Thus, the negative 
coefficient on previous tenure widely reported in the wage-loss literature 
should be read as simply indicating that tenure on the lost job raises wages 
on that job by more than it does on the "second" job. We identify the 
degree of inflation of the wage-loss estimate produced by uncritical use of 
the tenure argument: for the worker with median tenure the degree of 
overstatement is around 45%. 
Second, the length of the intervening spell of unemployment emerges 
as a potent source of reduced earnings on the postdisplacement job. Our 
simple ordinary least squares (OLS) results suggest that an increase in 
unemployment duration of 10% will lower wages on the subsequent job 
by .6%-.8%. However, we also report evidence of simultaneity between 
the postdisplacement wage and unemployment duration. Allowing for si- 
multaneity actually strengthens the negative impact of duration: a corre- 
sponding increase in duration reducing wages between .8% and 1.4%. 
Third, the wage consequences of a change in industry and occupation, 
although not location, are profound. Depending on the specification of 
the postdisplacement wage equation, our preferred estimates suggest that 
industry shifts lower the postdisplacement wage in the range 16.1%-19.8% 
and that occupational shifts are associated with lower wages of between 
5.4% and 13.9%. 
II. An Accounting Framework 
In seeking to discover the effects of job displacement on earnings, we 
shall argue that the overriding priority is to work with a flexible earnings 
function so as to avoid the pitfalls of the conventional displacement lit- 
erature while incorporating insights into the role of individual and job 
match heterogeneity offered by the modern earnings-function literature. 
The former literature typically employs the standard Mincerian earnings 
function to inquire into the sources of earnings loss and in so doing places 
very strong restrictions on the parameters of the model. The latter literature 
emphasizes the biases on the tenure (and experience) coefficient(s) intro- 
duced by omitted variables that are positively related to tenure and earnings 
(Topel 1986; Abraham and Farber 1987; Altonji and Shakotko 1987). 
Consider the following representation of the earnings function, which, 
for expositional convenience, considers only tenure and unemployment 
arguments and neglects individual and time subscripts. The natural loga- 
rithm of individual earnings in job j may be expressed 
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In W) = , a5TENURE, + (au + 1,3)TENUREh + 1 ySLU, + u, 
s=1 s=1 
(1) 
where TENURES is completed job duration on job s, TENUREj is current 
tenure, SLUS is completed spell length of unemployment, or search, prior 
to job s, a is the transferable, general-training component of the return to 
TENURE, 3 is the nontransferable, specific-training component, and u is 
a disturbance term. 
Note that in equation (1) we allow investments in general training to 
differ from job to job, so that a1 * a2 * ... aj. The as coefficients will 
provide us with information on the past investment profile. The TENURES 
sequence enriches the model by incorporating information on prior mo- 
bility (Mincer and Jovanovic 1981). 
Turning to the unemployment duration argument, it is possible that 
unemployed workers may suffer some depreciation of their human capital 
(Lazear 1976; Kiker and Roberts 1984) that, coupled with stigma effects 
(Heckman and Borjas 1980), may be expected to lower wages. A declining 
reservation wage will also yield a negative association between wages and 
duration.' In addition, less efficient searchers may find themselves un- 
employed for longer durations and obtain lower wages on reemployment 
(Mincer 1986). Each mechanism runs counter to the standard productive- 
search model wherein, given a constant reservation wage assumption, longer 
spell duration tends to yield higher postunemployment wages (Stigler 1962; 
Lippman and McCall 1976). 
Simple manipulation of equation (1) yields 
I j-1 
In W) = a, z TENURES + E (as - a1)TENUREs 
s 1 s=2 (2) 
+ (a1 + j3y - a1)TENURE1 + E ysSLUs + u,. 
s=1 
Letting al = a2 = . . . = a1 and = 0 (s = 1,... ,j), we arrive at the more 
familiar wage equation 
ln Wj = a1 EXPERIENCE + (aj + j - al)TENURE1 + uj. (3) 
In other words, specification (3) compounds the effects of previous job 
durations and previous unemployment durations in a single coefficient; 
1 Theoretical reasons for declining reservation wages include finite lives, income 
constraints, and exhaustion of benefits. 
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and the current tenure coefficient is then to be interpreted as the effect of 
tenure on wage growth over and above that resulting from experience, aL. 
Note that the specific, nontransferable component, j3, of the tenure coef- 
ficient is not identified unless one imposes the restriction that sa = a,. 
Furthermore, if the experience variable is subject to measurement error, 
the tenure coefficient will also be affected. The estimate of a, will be biased 
downward, thus biasing upward the tenure coefficient. One possible source 
of measurement error arises from the difficulty of distinguishing between 
previous job durations and unemployment durations. Finally, note that if 
the worker is increasingly investing in general training (e.g., younger workers 
or those who, being aware of their impending displacement, switch from 
specific- into general-training investments) so that a1 > a1, then the tenure 
coefficient will be increased even though no additional investment in spe- 
cific training is observed. 
The general approach implied by equation (1) is thus likely to provide 
richer insights into worker investment profiles, job-matching strategies, 
lob-search behavior, and unemployment effects on wages. Moreover, its 
formulation allows one to test the assumptions implicit in equation (3). 
The empirical application of equation (1) is remitted to Section IV. 
III. The Data 
Our data are drawn from a special survey conducted in January 1984 as 
a supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS). The purpose of 
this Displaced Worker Survey (DWS) was to obtain information on the 
number and characteristics of all adult workers displaced from their jobs 
between January 1979 and January 1984. In order to identify such workers, 
CPS respondents were first asked whether they or any other household 
member had lost a job over the 5-year sample period "because of a plant 
closing, an employer going out of business, a layoff from which [he/she] 
was not recalled or other similar reasons." If the answer to this question 
was in the affirmative, the respondent was then asked to identify which 
among the following categories best fitted the reason for job loss: (i) plant 
or company closed down or moved; (ii) plant or company was still op- 
erating but job lost because of (a) slack work, (b) position or shift abolished, 
or (c) seasonal job was completed; (iii) self-employment business failed; 
and, (iv) other reasons. 
A series of questions were then asked of respondents as to the nature 
of the lost job, including year of loss, years of tenure, and earnings.2 Another 
set of questions sought to determine what transpired after job loss. These 
included the length of the unemployment spell, unemployment insurance 
benefit status, exhaustion of benefits, and worker relocation. Finally, if the 
2 In the event of more than one displacement, the data refer to the job with the 
longest duration. 
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worker was reemployed at the time of the interview, follow-up questions 
were deployed so as to determine the current (January 1984) level of earn- 
ings, occupation, and industry attachment among other things. 
The value of the DWS is precisely that it is a large, nationally represen- 
tative microdata set. In weighted terms the survey identifies some 13.9 
million displaced workers. Previous studies of displaced workers have either 
been of the case-study type (reviewed by Gordus, Jarley, and Ferman [198 1]) 
or have investigated small samples of laid-off workers derived from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) or the National Longitudinal 
Survey (NLS) (Shapiro and Sandell 1985; Maxwell 1986; Hamermesh 
1987). Other, broader-based econometric studies of trade-displaced work- 
ers have the disadvantage that many of those identified as displaced returned 
to their old employers (Neumann 1978; Corson and Nicholson 1981). 
All of this is not to suggest that the DWS is without its own difficulties. 
First, the rotating nature of the CPS makes longitudinal use difficult. Our 
response is to focus on relative wage changes in the wake of displacement, 
namely the difference between pre- and postdisplacement weekly earnings, 
suitably adjusted for interim price movements. Second, reliance on ret- 
rospective information going back up to 5 years raises the problem of 
recall bias. Fortunately, there are no signs that this form of measurement 
error disturbs our findings with respect to the contribution of tenure on 
the lost job to the postdisplacement wage.3 
Third, there is some ambiguity as to the reported unemployment duration 
measure. The duration data supplied in the DWS do not necessarily refer 
to a single spell of unemployment. They may include a period in which 
the respondent was out of the labor force and even more than one spell 
of unemployment if the respondent links such spells to the initial job loss. 
The possibility of unidentified, intruded spells of temporary employment 
means that we cannot, in practice, identify current tenure on the postdis- 
placement job as the difference between January 1984 and the date of job 
loss plus reported spell length of unemployment. In this article, we simply 
use year-of-displacement dummies as a crude proxy for tenure on the 
postdisplacement job. 
Despite this fuzziness, one major advantage of the DWS is that it contains 
information on completed spells of unemployment. But there remain two 
sources of right censoring in the duration data that will need ultimately 
to be accommodated in our analysis. Continuous duration data are supplied 
for those whose jobless spells were still in progress as of January 1984 but 
only up to 99 weeks of joblessness. To those who are currently in an 
When we estimated separate equations for specific years, the predisplacement 
tenure coefficient in the postdisplacement wage equations was larger for the most 
recent years. This would seem to imply that, if anything, recall errors understate 
the results reported below with respect to the impact of previous tenure. 
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ongoing spell of unemployment for less than the 99-week cut-off, therefore, 
must be added those workers whose joblessness either has exceeded or 
exceeds 99 weeks by an unknown margin. Both sources of sample trun- 
cation will be factored into our analysis. 
A final consideration is that job tenure on the predisplacement job could 
be spuriously productive of income in the postdisplacement job if some 
of the sample of displaced workers returned to their previous employer. 
Bias from this source is unlikely to be profound because we are dealing 
with subcategories of the permanently displaced, a large proportion of 
whom lost jobs by reason of plant closure or relocation. Accordingly, 
deciding whether or not the worker was merely temporarily separated 
from his employer is much less problematic here than in other large data 
sets (e.g., the Social Security Administration's Longitudinal Employee- 
Employer Data). Moreover, our exclusion of those workers displaced be- 
cause of seasonal factors and for "other reasons" should serve further to 
reduce problems of data contamination. For these reasons, our finding that 
tenure on the predisplacement job is productive of income in the postdis- 
placement job is unlikely to be a chimera produced by the displaced worker 
returning to his previous employer.4 
In addition to excluding groups of workers by source of displacement, 
we confined our sample to male workers between 20 and 65 years of age 
who were displaced from full-time nonagricultural jobs over the full 5 
years covered by the DWS and who were economically active as of January 
1984. These restrictions produced an unweighted sample of 3,223 workers 
of whom 2,007 were reemployed in either full-time or part-time jobs by 
January 1984 and who reported a wage for the new job. Descriptive data 
on the full sample and the subsample of the reemployed are given in Ap- 
pendix A. 
IV. Empirical Implementation of the Model 
In specifying equation (1), no account was taken of the possible effects 
of unobserved job match or individual heterogeneity. Although our data 
do not allow us adequately to address the job-match heterogeneity argu- 
ment (most notably because of missing data on completed tenure in the 
postdisplacement job),5 we will attempt to control for individual heter- 
ogeneity by conditioning the postdisplacement wage equation on the pre- 
displacement wage (Topel 1986). In implementing that specification we 
initially allow the coefficient on the predisplacement wage to be freely 
estimated (as do Kiefer and Neumann [1979]) but subsequently impose 
In support of this contention, we note that restricting the sample to those who 
moved industry-a crude proxy for not returning to the previous employer-actually 
served to increase the return to predisplacement tenure on the postdisplacement 
job. 
5 For an explicit empirical test of the job matching model, see Flinn (1986). 
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the restriction that the coefficient equals unity, thereby providing a better 
control for permanent, individual unobserved heterogeneity (in the manner 
of Bartel and Borjas [1981]). 
We restrict our attention to just two job pairs, namely the predisplace- 
ment job, j - 1, and the postdisplacement lob, J. Given the nature of the 
data set, we perforce ignore the effects of unemployment duration prior 
to j - 1, and, accordingly, the coefficients reported below are to be inter- 
preted with some caution since we are now working with a tentative ap- 
proximation to the model. 
Accordingly, we specify the following pre- and postdisplacement wage 
equations for individual i (where Xi is a matrix of individual and demo- 
graphic variables): 
ln Wij_1 = a, EXPERIENCEi j1 + (aj-, + 3y-1 - al)TENUREi, 1 
+ XiJ_1Q + i 
ln Wij = a EXPERIENCEi + (a, - a1)TENUREi 1, 1 
~~~~~~~~~(5) 
+ (a, + B - al)TENUREi + yjSLUij + XijQ + uij, 
In Wij = 6 ln Wi ,11 + (1 - 6)a1EXPERIENCEij 
+ [(1 - 6)(aj- - al) - 8,-1 ]TENUREi ,1 () 
+ [aj + B - a,(1 - 6)]TENUREij + yjSLUij 
+ (Xij - 6Xi J1)Q + (uij - ui jJ) 
and, finally, 
In Wij = In Wi ,f1 + (aj + Pj)TENUREij - PjlTENUREi, ] 
(7) 
+ yjSLUij + (Xij - XiJ1)Q + (uij - ij-1) 
Our focus will be upon the estimates of the tenure and unemployment 
duration coefficients. In particular, equation (4) should yield the return 
to tenure over and above that resulting from experience (i.e., [ay11 + Pj_1 
- a,]); equation (5) should give us an estimate of the transferable com- 
ponent of this return above a, (i.e., [aj_1 - al]); and from equation (7) 
we have an estimate of the loss in specific-training investments (-p11). 
Note that interpretation of the parameters of equation (6), which has been 
widely used in the literature, is in fact clouded because of the presence of 
a constant of proportionality that affects most of the coefficients.6 
6 Other problems that attach to the inclusion of the predisplacement wage as a 
regressor have to do with its endogeneity and possible association with unem- 
ployment duration as a result of the procedure used to deflate the predisplacement 
wage. In our case, the latter correlation is negligible. 
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In practice, we substitute age (EXPERIENCE + SCHOOL + 6) for 
experience and hence also include a schooling variable. The age variable 
is not entered in continuous form but, rather, via three linear splines.7 Our 
basic estimating equation for the predisplacement wage includes-in ad- 
dition to the age, tenure, and schooling arguments-dummies for race, 
skill level, city, and region. The postdisplacement wage equations supple- 
ment these variables not only with the duration of unemployment but also 
with dummies for changes in residence, industry, occupation, and full- 
time job status. As noted in Section III, year dummies picking up the time 
of displacement are substituted for an unreported current tenure argument. 
In estimating equation (7) we included the full set of Xij variables to in- 
vestigate additional sources of earnings loss. 
Equations (4)-(7) were first estimated by OLS. Equation (4) is presented 
in Appendix B. The predisplacement wage function is conventional enough, 
and all coefficients are significant at the .05 level or better and of the 
expected sign. The statistical significance of the age splines indicates major 
differences between the three age profiles. Between the ages of 20 and 35 
earnings increase, ceteris paribus, at 1.9% a year; after 35, earnings continue 
to rise at a reduced rate of .2% a year until 50 years of age. Thereafter, 
earnings decline at some 2.1 percent a year. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equations (5)-(7) are given 
in columns 1, 3, and 5 of table 1. Focusing first on the basic postdisplace- 
ment wage equation, an interesting finding is the significantly positive 
coefficient of TENUREL. It will be recalled that the initial tenure argument 
was retained to test the hypothesis that the general-training component 
of the return to tenure on the first job is not fully captured by the age (or 
experience) variable (s). 
The schooling, age, race, location, and year dummies are all significant 
and have the same signs as in the predisplacement wage equation.8 These 
results, together with the obvious effect on (weekly) earnings of changing 
from full- to part-time job status, need not detain us further. More notable 
findings are the strongly negative effects of changes in industry and 
7We also experimented with a quadratic spline specification. This exercise did 
not produce improved results and, for expositional convenience, only results for 
the linear spline formulation are given here. 
8 It will be recalled that the year dummies proxy tenure on the postdisplacement 
job. Their coefficients tend to decline the closer displacement is to the end of survey 
period, although the decline is not monotonic not only because the proxy picks 
up the effect of macroeconomic fluctuations but also because those displaced in 
the most recent interval are less likely to be reemployed and hence report earnings. 
Note that we would anyway be reluctant to place undue emphasis on even a correctly 
identified current tenure variable precisely because of the censored design of the 
sample; that is to say, the maximum possible tenure on the postdisplacement job 
is only 5 years in this data set. 
Table 1 
Postdisplacement Wage Equations 
Specification 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CONSTANT 5.040* 5.138* 2.521* 2.294* .088 -.029 (59.42) (45.35) (17.93) (13.83) (1.05) (.27) 
SCHOOL .045* .036* .027* .021 * .009** .008 (9.31) (6.34) (6.06) (4.01) (1.96) (1.49) 
AGE: 
20-35 .015* .019* .004 .007** -.006*** -.002 (4.65) (5.36) (1.44) (2.23) (1.91) (.70) 
36-50 -.012** -.013** -.002 -.003 .008 .006 
(2.13) (2.22) (.37) (.51) (1.41) (1.00) 
51-65 -.025* -.032* -.018** -.025* -.011 -.020** 
(2.95) (3.40) (2.34) (2.99) (1.31) (2.19) 
TENUREI .013** .014* -.002 -.002 -.016* -.015* (2.53) (2.72) (.48) (.37) (3.33) (2.91) 
TENUREISQ -.00045** -.0005** -.0001 -.0001 .00025 .00021 
(2.39) (2.53) (.56) (.62) (1.32) (1.07) 
WHITE .183* .118** .090** .047 .000 -.011 (4.40) (2.49) (2.39) (1.09) (.01) (.23) 
UNSKILLED -.153* -.143* -.128* -.116* -.104* -.094* (6.16) (5.44) (5.71) (4.87) (4.21) (3.67) 
SMSA .076* .105* .043** .066* .011 .033 (3.36) (4.36) (2.10) (3.02) (.50) (1.43) 
SOUTH -.073** -.114* -.009 -.028 .053 .043 (2.19) (3.13) (.29) (.84) (1.62) (1.23) 
MOVEREG .036 ... -.007 ... -.048*** ... (1.34) (.30) (1.83) 
M/OVEIND -.200* . .. -.175* . .. -.150* .. . (8.06) (7.80) (6.10) 
MOVEOOC -.145* ... -.096* ... -.049** (5.95) (4.35) (2.02) 
PART TIME -.850* ... -.802* ... -.756* ... (12.72) (13.30) (11.39) 
YEAR: 
1979 .148* ... .123* ... .098** 
(3.62) (3.32) (2.42) 
1980 .087** ... .066* ... .046 ... 
(2.35) (1.98) (1.24) 
1981 .109* ... .078 * * ... .049 ... (3.20) (2.54) (1.44) 
1982 .096* .. .067** ... .040 ... (2.98) (2.31) (1.24) 
lnWAGE1 0 0 .509* .550* 1 1 (21.35) (21.77) 
InDURATION -.059* -.067* -.066* -.074* -.073* -.080* (9.01) (9.75) (11.12) (11.98) (11.11) (12.03) 
LAMBDA ... -.256* ... -.137* ... -.040 (4.50) (2.65) (.73) 
R 2 .310 .196 .439 .350 .193 .108 
NOTE.-Absolute t-values are given in parentheses. 
*p < .01. 
**.0 <ps .05. 
*** .05 < p --- .10. 
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occupation (although not location) and the length of the spell of unem- 
ployment on the postdisplacement wage. Changes in industry and occu- 
pation following job loss are associated with reductions in the postdis- 
placement wage of 18.1% and 13.5%, respectively. For the reemployed 
worker, the estimated elasticity of the postdisplacement wage with respect 
to duration is -.06. The clear suggestion of this latter result is that, on 
balance, declining reservation wages, depreciation, and stigma effects as- 
sociated witl. longer spell lengths dominate productive search out- 
comes. We return to a fuller discussion of the unemployment duration 
results below. 
The wage functions reported in columns 3 and 5 of table 1 both suggest 
that higher education levels reduce any loss in earnings attendant on dis- 
placement and that unskilled workers experience significantly higher 
earnings losses than their semiskilled and skilled counterparts. In both 
specifications, the strongly negative effects on earnings of unemployment 
duration and changes in industry and occupation are again evident. 
Greater reliance is to be placed upon the wage-difference model (eq. 
[7]) because of its ability to control for permanent, unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. Here the results in column 5 strongly confirm that a sub- 
stantial overstatement of the earnings loss is implied by conventional routes 
to the measurement of firm-specific training investments. Although tenure 
is negatively and significantly associated with the change in wages, the 
coefficient is markedly lower than that implied by the predisplacement 
equation. Note, too, that its value is almost exactly the difference between 
the corresponding coefficients reported in Appendix B and column 1 of 
table 1. The same is true of the other coefficients significantly associated 
with wage change; namely, schooling, age (the first age spline), and skill 
level. The elasticity of the postdisplacement wage with respect to duration 
strengthens to -.07. 
Note that as the coefficient on the predisplacement wage rises from 0 
to .5 to unity (specifications 1, 3, and 5, respectively) all coefficients of the 
variables that influence the postdisplacement wage but not the predisplacement 
wage steadily decline in magnitude (with the exception of unemployment 
duration), probably reflecting the presence of unobserved individual het- 
erogeneity. 
Finally, table 1 also contains selectivity-adjusted results for the three 
postdisplacement wage equations. As noted earlier, our sample is truncated 
since a considerable fraction of the displaced worker sample is not employed 
full-time or part-time as of January 1984. For such workers the effects of 
the determinants of postdisplacement earnings may differ systematically 
from those of employed workers. Typically, it is assumed that if a worker 
is reemployed, the offered wage is either equal to or greater than the res- 
ervation wage, and conversely for those currently unemployed. In order 
to account for the possibility of censoring bias-namely, that the sample 
Unemployment Duration and Earnings Changes 291 
of reemployed workers is not in fact a random sample drawn from the 
(stock of the) unemployed-the conventional two-step selectivity adjust- 
ment procedure suggested by Heckman (1979) was implemented. At this 
stage a number of the variables contained in the basic postdisplacement 
wage equation were excluded from the (probit) analysis because they are 
observed only in the event of reemployment (changes in industry, occu- 
pation, and job status). Also, because they are intrinsically associated with 
the censoring mechanism, the year-of-displacement dummies were dropped 
from the wage equations. The underlying reemployment equation (probit) 
is reported in Appendix C and the selectivity-adjusted estimates appear 
alongside their corresponding specifications in table 1. 
The standard search model with a constant reservation wage and no 
human capital depreciation or stigma effects would suggest that the sub- 
sample of still-unemployed workers would have a higher postdisplacement 
wage due to higher reservation wages (search efficiency). The presence of 
such effects, however, might justify at least in part the use of unemployment 
duration as an additional regressor. If that variable cannot capture all the 
above effects or if longer unemployment duration picks up job search 
inefficiencies (Mincer 1986), then the association between duration and 
the probability of being in the reemployed sample will make it difficult 
to disentangle the various effects and the expected sign of the lambda 
coefficient is no longer unambiguous. The lambda coefficients reported in 
the table should be interpreted with these observations in mind. 
Both the postdisplacement wage equations displayed in columns 2 and 
4 of table 1 point to negative selection. That is to say, holding constant 
unemployment duration, the currently unemployed are predicted to have 
somewhat higher postdisplacement wages than their equivalent reemployed 
counterparts. (Inclusion of the selectivity argument does not alter the other 
coefficients substantively.) Note, however, that the lambda coefficient, al- 
though still negative, is statistically insignificant in the wage-difference 
equation (col. 6). Also note that in all three specifications the negative 
effect of unemployment duration on postdisplacement wages is strength- 
ened, the elasticities now ranging from -.07 to -.08. 
A correct reading of the search-theoretic literature would suggest that 
the postdisplacement wage and the duration of unemployment are jointly 
determined. Not only does duration have a direct impact on reservation 
and offered wages but the latter will also feed back into duration. Unfor- 
tunately, only a few studies have explicitly sought to recoup the structural 
parameters of the wage and duration equations (Kiefer and Neumann 1979; 
Lancaster and Chester 1984). When self-selection into reemployment status 
can be ignored, the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator can be em- 
ployed. With censoring, simultaneous equation models with truncated de- 
pendent variables have to be considered (Amemiya 1974; Lee, Maddala, 
and Trost 1980; Lee 1982). 
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Table 2 
Simultaneous Determination of the Postdisplacement Wage and 
Unemployment Duration Equations, Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
and Selectivity Adjusted Simultaneous Equations (SASE) 
Equation 2SLS SASE 2SLS SASE 2SLS SASE 
lnWAGE2: 
InDURATION -.022 -.044*** -.133* 117* -.234* -.174* 
(.83) (1.98) (5.31) (5.71) (7.85) (8.08) 
InWAGEI 0 0 .523* .559* 1 1 
(20.83) (21.28) 
LAMBDA ... -.248* ... -.148* ... -.070 
(4.24) (2.78) (1.22) 
InDURATION: 
lnWAGE2 -.793* -1.460** 793* -1.460** ... (4.10) (2.15) (4.10) (2.15) 
InDIFF ... ... ... ... -.793* - 1.460** 
(4.10) (2.15) 
InWAGE1 .621* .911** .621* .911** -.173 -.548 
(4.58) (2.50) (4.58) (2.50) (1.34) (1.62) 
LAMBDA ... -1.305** ... -1.305** ... -1.305** 
(2.23) (2.23) (2.23) 
NOTE.-The estimates hown for the duration equation are the same across specifications because the 
set of regressors in the reduced-form wage equations are identical. 
*P <.01. 
**.01 <p <.05. 
*** 
.05 <p ' .10. 
The results of a crude test of simultaneity using both methods are reported 
in table 2. As in any exercise of this type, our results depend crucially on 
the adequacy of the identification constraints. Variables excluded from the 
wage equation include reasons for displacement, whether or not the worker 
received advance notification of impending redundancy, marital status, 
and industry and regional dummies applicable to the job at displacement. 
For the duration equation, the variables excluded are tenure and its square 
(note, too, that age now enters linearly rather than in spline form). Reasons 
for displacement, advance notification, marital status, and even industry 
of job loss are likely to be reservation-wage specific. 
The results in table 2 point to evidence of simultaneity bias in equations 
that incorporate unemployment duration. Looking first at the structural 
form postdisplacement wage equation, it can be seen that increases in 
duration reduce postdisplacement wages across all specifications (although 
quite clearly the effect is measured with imprecision), the negative selec- 
tivity coefficient suggesting that yet-to-be-reemployed workers have 
relatively higher predicted earnings than their currently employed coun- 
terparts, controlling for duration effects. As in the OLS case, however, 
selectivity bias is not indicated for the wage-difference equation shown in 
the last column. For the duration equation, an increase of 10% in offered 
wages decreases unemployment duration by between 7.9% and 14.6%. On 
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the other hand, a 10% increase in the predisplacement wage increases du- 
ration by between 6.2% and 9.1 %. The selectivity argument now has a 
very simple interpretation: the currently unemployed have longer durations 
of unemployment than earlier experienced by the currently employed. The 
basic inferences from the duration equation are as follows. First, predis- 
placement wages likely raise reservation wages and thus increase duration. 
Second, the higher postdisplacement wages, given the predisplacement 
wage, the shorter is the unemployment spell. This outcome may be the 
result of either a higher arrival rate of job offers or simply higher offered 
wages. Returning to the line of causation running from duration to post- 
displacement wages, the suggestion would appear to be that longer du- 
rations associated with lower reservation wages, human capital deprecia- 
tion, and stigma effects dominate productive search. 
Although the results provided in table 2 do indicate that simultaneous 
equations bias attaches to OLS estimates such as those presented in table 
1, it is unfortunate that the coefficients on unemployment duration vary 
so widely across specification (namely from -.02 to -.23). This outcome 
might reflect either the poor predictive power of the duration equation or 
the presence of censoring bias and with it the inadequacy of the two-step 
selectivity correction estimator employed, or both. 
Since information on the duration of yet-to-be-completed spells of 
unemployment is available in our data set, the duration equation can be 
estimated more efficiently using this additional duration information via 
a maximum-likelihood method that explicitly incorporates the stochastic 
nature of censoring. We employ an accelerated failure time model 
(Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980), which in this application is equivalent to 
a Tobit model in which the truncation point is variable. Using this meth- 
odology, we duly estimated a reduced-form duration equation. The pre- 
dicted duration variable was then used as a regressor in the postdisplacement 
wage equation(s) (Lee 1981). Our model thus conforms to an instrumental 
variables approach. Maximum-likelihood estimates of the duration equation 
are given in Appendix D, and instrumental variables estimates of the post- 
displacement wage equations containing a predicted-duration variable are 
presented in table 3. All the results in the reduced-form unemployment- 
duration equation seem sensible and are more robust than their probit 
counterparts. In particular, the source of job-loss dummies and advance 
notification significantly reduce the duration of unemployment. Note also 
that previous job duration positively influences the duration of unem- 
ployment. All the other results are conventional enough with the exception 
of the statistical insignificance of the coefficient on the predisplacement 
wage. Note, however, that we are now dealing with a reduced-form equa- 
tion so that the coefficient on the previous wage compounds its effect on 
the reservation wage with the effect of its worker quality content on the 
offered wage. 
Table 3 
Postdisplacement Wage Equations Using Predicted Values 
for Unemployment Duration from 
Maximum-Likelihood Estimates 
Specification 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CONSTANT 5.358* 5.150* 2.911* 2.406* .433* .132 
(43.59) (39.44) (17.77) (13.65) (3.51) (1.04) 
SCHOOL .037* .036* .019* .018* .001 .004 
(6.79) (5.97) (3.79) (3.38) (.16) (.73) 
AGE: 
20-35 .015* .019* .004 .008** -.007** -.002 
(4.43) (5.27) (1.31) (2.26) (2.05) (.59) 
36-50 -.011 -.013** -.001 -.002 .009 .006 
(9.97) (2.05) (.24) (.40) (1.54) (1.07) 
51-65 -.023* -.034* -.016** -.028* -.009 -.022** 
(2.63) (3.59) (2.00) (3.20) (1.00) (2.40) 
TENURE1 .013* .014* -.001 -.005 -.016* -.013** 
(2.64) (2.61) (.23) (.10) (3.09) (2.40) 
TENURE1SQ -.00046** -.0005** -.0001 -.00013 .00025 .00016 
(2.37) (2.35) (.60) (.70) (1.30) (.80) 
WHITE .117* .108** .023 .025 -.072 -.043 
(2.58) (2.17) (.55) (.56) (1.59) (.90) 
UNSKILLED -.127* -.138* -.102* -.101* -.077* -.069** 
(4.78) (4.95) (4.22) (3.96) (2.88) (2.55) 
SMSA .083* .111* .051** .077* .018 .049** 
(3.59) (4.43) (2.40) (3.40) (.78) (2.03) 
SOUTH -.107* -.124* -.047 -.043 .014 .023 
(3.13) (3.31) (1.50) (.127) (.41) (.64) 
MOVEREG .011 ... -.034 ... -.078* ... 
(.40) (1.38) (2.92) 
MOVEIND -.220* ... -.198* ... -.175* ... 
(8.79) (8.67) (6.97) 
MOVEOCC -.150* ... -.103* ... -.055** ... 
(6.05) (4.53) (2.20) 
PART TIME -.839* ... -.793* -.745* ... 
(12.38) (12.84) (10.96) 
YEAR: 
1979 .102** ... .073*** ... .044** 
(2.43) (1.93) (1.06) 
1980 .043 ... .018 ... -.007 
(1.14) (.53) (.19) 
1981 .079** ... .045 ... .011 ... 
(2.30) (1.44) (.31) 
1982 .078** ... .046 ... .014 ... 
(2.36) (1.54) (.42) 
InWAGEI 0 0 .497* .547* 1 1 
(20.42) (21.01) 
InDURATION -.089* -.075* -.094* -.109* -.099* -.138* 
(4.87) (3.49) (5.68) (5.62) (5.45) (6.66) 
LAMBDA ... -.113*** ... .064 ... .211* 
(1.65) (1.03) (3.21) 
R 2 .291 .163 .414 .314 .156 .064 
* p < .01. 
** .01 <p < .05. 
***.05p ' .10. 
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The most notable feature of the fitted equations in table 3 is the consis- 
tency and strength of the unemployment-duration variable. The direct 
effect of duration on the postdisplacement wage and the change in wages 
is strongly negative: a 10% increase in unemployment duration decreases 
the accepted wage in the ranges .8%-1.4% and .9%-1.0% for the estimates 
with and without selectivity correction, respectively. Also of interest is the 
change in the lambda coefficient. Its sign is now positive for the specifi- 
cations reported in columns 4 and 6 of table 3 and is statistically significant 
in the wage-difference equation, suggesting that, controlling for the direct 
effect of duration on wages and individual heterogeneity, the currently 
unemployed have greater wage losses than their employed counterparts. 
This is in one sense a more realistic result that presumably reflects the 
likelihood that both the duration and the selectivity arguments are picking 
up the effects of a declining reservation wage on postdisplacement wages. 
As before, the coefficients of the variables that influence the postdisplace- 
ment wage but not the predisplacement wage steadily decline in magnitude 
(again with the exception of unemployment duration) as the coefficient 
on the predisplacement wage rises from zero to unity. 
One other feature of the wage-difference equation (col. 6 of the table) 
that merits some attention is the emergence of age-related wage losses over 
and above that effect produced by the shape of the age-earnings function. 
The wages of the oldest group fall by 2.8% a year in the postdisplacement 
job (col. 2 of table 3). The wage difference amounts to a statistically sig- 
nificant 1.8% a year (col. 6 of table 3). These results are largely due to the 
fact that the industry and occupational dummies are dropped from the 
equation. In other words, older workers are less likely to locate or be 
offered lobs in their old industry or occupation. 
We turn finally to the overstatement of the loss in earnings resulting 
from the assumption that the returns to tenure on the predisplacement job 
are sacrificed in their entirety on displacement. As we have shown, this 
overstatement is caused by uncritically identifying the tenure coefficient 
with the return to firm-specific training investments. The exaggeration of 
firm-specific training losses can be approached in a number of ways. Here, 
we rely on two measures based on a comparison of the tenure-earnings 
profile on the old job with the TENUREI-earnings relation constructed 
for the new job. Our first measure compares the height of the two profiles 
at various tenure intervals and is the ratio of the computed returns to 
TENUREi in the postdisplacement job to the corresponding returns to 
that tenure on the predisplacement job. Our second measure focuses on 
the size of the gap between the two functions and thus has a basis in the 
estimated "wage-change" functions. It is computed as the ratio of the 
"returns" to TENUREl in the wage-change equation to the returns to 
that variable in the predisplacement job. Table 4 reports the results of this 
exercise for the three specifications of the postdisplacement wage and for 
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Table 4 
Measures of the Overstatement of the Earnings Loss from Assuming 
Returns to Tenure on the First Job Are Lost on 
Displacement, Selectivity-adjusted Estimates 
Tenure Interval 
Ninetieth Ninety-fifth 
Median Mean Percentile Percentile 
(TENURE1 (TENURE1 (TENURE I (TENURE1 
Specification = 3) = 4.564) = 12) = 17) 
Ordinary least squares: 
Ratio a .473 .464 .404 .343 
Ratio b .527 .538 .606 .678 
Two-stage least squares: 
Ratio a .434 .425 .371 .315 
Ratio b .366 .380 .470 .565 
Instrumental variables 
approach: 
Ratio a .473 .465 .413 .359 
Ratio b .450 .461 .527 .595 
NOTE.-Ratio a is obtained by dividing the corn puted return to TENUREI in the postdisplacement 
wage equation by the return to tenure in the predisplacement wage equation. Ratio b is obtained by 
dividing the computed loss to TENUREI in the wage-change equation by the return to tenure in the 
predisp lacement wage equation. 
four tenure intervals. Thus, for a worker with the mean tenure of around 
4.5 years, TENUREI yields a return on the postdisplacement job that 
ranges between 42.5% and 46.5% of the return received on that tenure on 
the predisplacement job. Alternatively, using the second ratio, the size of 
the gap between the TENURE 1-earnings profiles in the two jobs amounts 
to between 38.0% and 53.8%/o of the returns to tenure on the predisplacement 
job. Evidently, considerable overstatement of wage loss is involved in con- 
ventional estimates (e.g., Hamermesh 1987). The degree of overstatement 
falls as we read across the table from left to right, but remains sizable. 
V. Conclusions 
Our purpose has been to uncover the determinants of relative changes 
in earnings associated with involuntary job separations. Our analysis has 
sought in particular to isolate the effects of previous job duration and the 
length of the intervening spell of unemployment. 
An important result is that tenure on the first job is associated with 
higher earnings in the postdisplacement job. This outcome could be pro- 
duced by a job-shopping strategy (Jovanovic 1979), by the location of the 
individual on the rising portion of his general-training investment profile, 
or, more narrowly, by a switching phenomenon as might occur when 
workers who anticipate their impending displacement substitute general- 
for specific-training investments. Each of the above possibilities points to 
a positive correlation between job duration and earnings growth and each 
escapes detection in the conventional Mincerian earnings function. 
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Our methodology and empirical results together provide a strong in- 
dictment of approaches that, in computing earnings losses, focus on the 
sacrifice of firm-specific investments in human capital obtained from the 
coefficient on tenure in the predisplacement wage equation. While there 
may indeed be significant losses associated with yet-to-be fully depreciated 
specific-training investments (some hint as to which may be provided by 
the strongly negative coefficients attaching to changes in industry and 
occupation), the extent of such losses cannot be gauged from the tenure 
coefficient since the latter compounds a number of different effects. We 
have sought, however, to provide some measure of the overstatement of 
losses on firm-specific investments that results from assuming that the 
coefficient on tenure in the predisplacement wage equation represents a 
pure return to such investments. 
Spell length of unemployment emerges as a potent source of earnings 
loss. Identifying the role of duration is difficult because of simultaneity: 
not only does -unemployment duration influence postdisplacement wages 
via productive search, a declining reservation wage, and human capital 
depreciation, but also the postdisplacement wage affects duration via the 
wage-offer distribution and the arrival rate of job offers. The former effects 
seem to be of significance, but we have no way of gauging the component 
magnitudes of each. Nevertheless, we have been able to identify the direct 
effect of unemployment duration on wages, and we report an even stronger 
depressing effect than obtains in the OLS regressions. Our best guess is 
that a 10%/ increase in unemployment duration lowers accepted wages by 
about 1%. We note parenthetically that the coefficient on duration pro- 
gressively increases in absolute magnitude as the predisplacement wage 
enters the postdisplacement wage equation with coefficients of 0, .5, and 
1. The reverse is true for the coefficients on almost all the other arguments 
that influence the postdisplacement wage only, which seems to point to 
the presence of unobserved individual heterogeneity. 
Finally, some data limitations should be noted. To the extent that the 
returns to firm-specific investments take the form of fringes, we will have 
understated the losses to such investments. On the other hand, overstate- 
ment is implied by the existence of compensating differentials for job in- 
stability. In neither case do our data allow us to address these considerations. 
Moreover, the absence of direct information on job availability and the 
arrival rate of job offers is an additional lacuna of the present treatment. 
Nevertheless, the estimated effects of the postdisplacement wage on du- 
ration at least provide some hint as to the importance of these effects. For 
the future, each of these limitations should be tackled. One of the most 
intriguing questions that remains to be answered is whether chance, rather 
than choice, dominates in determining unemployment duration (Mortensen 
and Neumann 1984). 
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Appendix A 
Table Al 
Descriptive Statistics 
Full Sample Reemployed Sample 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD 
AGE 35.615 10.431 35.131 9.975 
SCHOOL 12.270 2.567 12.542 2.447 
TENUREI 4.679 5.955 4.564 5.779 
InDURATION ... ... 2.128 1.752 
InWAGEI 5.885 .483 5.907 .469 
1nWAGE2 ... ... 5.693 .592 
lnWAGE2-lnWAGE1 ... ... -.214 .544 
WHITE .889 ... .920 ... 
MARRIED .694 ... .728 ... 
SOUTH .120 ... .132 ... 
SMSA .551 ... .550 ... 
PART-TIME ... ... .029 ... 
UNSKILLED .383 ... .358 ... 
MOVEOCC ... ... .551 ... 
MOVEIND ... ... .614 ... 
MOVEREG ... ... .245 ... 
NOTIFIED .553 ... .520 ... 
CLOSED .399 ... .426 ... 
ABOLISH .105 ... .113 
YEAR: 
1979 .097 ... .117 ... 
1980 .141 ... .162 ... 
1981 .193 ... .217 ... 
1982 .275 ... .285 ... 
N 3,223 2,007 
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Appendix B Appendix C 
Table B1 Table C1 
The Predisplacement Wage Equation Probit Reemployment Estimates 
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient 
Constant 4.939* Constant -2.110* 
(70.65) (5.93) 
SCHOOL .036* SCHOOL .088* 
(8.71) (7.67) 
AGE: AGE: 
20-35 .019* 20-35 -.009 
(7.71) (1.14) 
36-50 -.017* 36-50 .013 
(3.65) (.98) 
51-65 -.023** 51-65 -.055* 
(2.49) (2.98) 
TENUREI .029* TENUREI -.008 
(6.91) (.68) 
TENURE1SQ -.00074* TENURE1SQ .0001 
(4.57) (.19) 
WHITE .193* MARRIED .348* 
(5.39) (6.03) 
UNSKILLED -.060* WHITE .557* 
(2.84) (6.97) 
SMSA .073* UNSKILLED -.169* 
(3.77) (3.02) 
SOUTH -.129* SMSA .050 
(4.52) (.87) 
YEAR: CLOSED .193* 
1979 .092* (3.42) 
(2.66) ABOLISH .177*** 
1980 .076** (1.94) 
(2.41) NOTIFIED .042 
1981 .083* (.82) 
(2.86) InWAGEl .118*** 
1982 .065** (1.92) 
(2.38) Log-likelihood -1,626.9 
R 2 ~~~~~.174 
NOTE.-Asymptotic absolute t-values are given in paren- 
NoTE.-Absolute t-values are given in parentheses. theses. The equation also included eight regional dummies, 
* p c .01. four year dummies, and seven industry dummies. 
** 0.1 < p < .05. **p '.01. ** 
.01 <p c .05. 
*** 
.05 <p c .10. 
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Appendix D 
Table D1 
Maximum-Likelihood Estimates of the Reduced-Form 
Unemployment-Duration Equation 
Variable Coefficient 
Constant 4.97* 
(.530) 
SCHOOL -.120* 
(.017) 
AGE: 
20-35 .021*** 
(.012) 
36-50 -.024 
(.0 19) 
51-65 .050*** 
(.028) 
TENUREI .044 ** 
(.017) 
TENUREISQ -.0001 1 
(.00006) 
MARRIED -.544* 
(.088) 
WHITE -.877* 
(.133) 
UNSKILLED .362* 
(.086) 
SMSA .031 
(.084) 
CLOSED -.570* 
(.083) 
ABOLISH -.248*** 
(.131) 
NOTIFIED -.216* 
(.075) 
InWAGEI -.038 
(.092) 
Sigma 1.982 
(.031) 
Log-likelihood -5305.92 
NOTE.-Asymptotic SEs are in parentheses. 
*P ? .01. 
**.01 <p?.05. 
***.05 <p ?.10. 
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